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We must suppose a very delicate adjustment whereby the circulation [of blood] 
follows the needs of cerebral activity. Blood very likely may rush to each region of 
the cortex according as it is most active, but of this we know nothing. I need hardly 
say that the activity of the nervous matter is the primary phenomenon, and the afflux 
of blood its secondary consequence. 
William James, 1890 (p.99) 
1. Introduction: 
As the above quote from James’s classic The Principles of Psychology shows, the existence of a 
relationship between cognitive activity and patterns of cerebral blood flow is not a new postulate. 
However, a century of research in diverse fields had to be conducted before the techniques that 
made it possible to study this relationship became available. Several developments to achieve 
various scientific and technical goals took place over a century and eventually gave us functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
1
 Techniques such as fMRI, as well as others (e.g. positron 
emission tomography (PET)), gave rise to cognitive neuroscience as a new research program. 
However, since its beginnings, this program has not been without its skeptics. Here, I argue that the 
sound use of fMRI in cognitive neuroscience gives rise to a productive kind of theory-ladenness 
thanks to its solid foundations in the physics of magnetic resonance and the physiology of 
hemodynamics. As I will demonstrate with concrete examples, this productive theory-ladenness 
makes possible the identification and control of potential errors in fMRI experiments (e.g. the 
development and use of the NPAIRS framework) and gives rise to novel and data-driven models of 
the neural bases of cognition independently of large-scale theories of cognition (e.g. the HERA 
model of memory). Before moving on, a brief summary of the skeptical accounts of neuroimaging 
will be useful. 
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 I focus on fMRI because it is the most commonly used neuroimaging method, but parallel analyses can be made about 
other neuroimaging methods, e.g. MEG or fNIRS, mutatis mutandis. 
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Most skeptical accounts of neuroimaging conclude that hypotheses of cognitive 
neuroscience are underdetermined by neuroimaging data. This body of work can be broadly 
classified under two groups: one group raises doubts about the theoretical significance of 
neuroimaging results; and the other points to methodological difficulties of obtaining reliable 
inferences from neuroimaging data.
2
 The work in the former group mostly appeals to issues of 
theory-ladenness and the work in the latter group emphasizes two major aspects of neuroimaging 
methodology: one, the highly complex nature of neuroimaging experiments; and two, the difficulty 
of modeling and drawing reliable inferences from neuroimaging data.  
In his early critical account, Uttal (2001, 2002a, 2002b) cites ladenness of neuroimaging 
findings in modularist theories as the most problematic aspect of cognitive neuroscience. Uttal's 
main issue is whether or not we can accurately define isolated modules of cognition, which can then 
be localized in the brain. Regardless of the localizability of cognitive processes in the brain, their 
inaccessibility has long been a major problem in psychological science. Uttal cites as support for his 
arguments a well-known discussion of this problem by MacCorquodale & Meehl (1948); many 
cognitive processes assumed to separately exist are in fact hypothetical constructs, which may not 
exist at all as described by the researcher. These criticisms may not be totally valid for 
contemporary neuroimaging work employing newer approaches of interpretation and analysis, e.g. 
multi-voxel pattern analysis, neural fields, pattern-decoding reverse inference (for a recent review 
and discussion please see Nathan & Del Pinal, 2017).  
Although Bechtel (2002a, 2002b) agrees that serious inferential problems exist in 
neuroimaging, he rejects Uttal’s general conclusion. He reminds that cognitive neuroscience is only 
one of the disciplines that proposes and tests theories that decompose a complex system into its 
components. In this kind of program, any and all such proposals are hypothetical; many of them are 
found to be incorrect and consequently revised. The important question, according to Bechtel, is not 
about the truth or falsity of modularist versus non-modularist theories, but whether or not 
researchers can obtain new findings from neuroimaging that would support certain componential 
theories while refuting or necessitating revision in others. In contrast to Bechtel, Hardcastle and 
Stewart (2002) agree with Uttal's skepticism and state that cognitive neuroscientists' modularist 
assumptions are "radically false" and neuroimaging cannot provide any support for modularist 
theories. This is because, prior to collecting data, researchers already assume the existence of 
                                                 
2
 The literature on the epistemology of neuroimaging includes a considerable number of works by philosophers of 
science and cognitive scientists. Naturally, a comprehensive review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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specific cognitive processes localized in different parts of the brain, which is no more than a mere 
prejudice (ibid.). Thus, there is an inherent circularity in neuroimaging, which presumably destroys 
the potential of findings to support modularist theories. 
 Cognitive scientists have also written on inferential difficulties in neuroimaging. However, 
similarly to the philosophers above, they have focused on questions about the validity of inferences 
from data to theories of cognition. The debate between Henson (2005) and Coltheart (2006, 2010) 
provides an illustrative example; in essence, Henson believes that neuroimaging results can be used 
to adjudicate between competing theories of cognition and Coltheart directly rejects this.
3
 Roskies 
(2009, 2010b) has provided strong defenses against Coltheart and other critics of neuroimaging. 
 The major theme in the above discussions is that the theory-ladenness of findings in 
neuroimaging creates serious problems of circularity in cognitive neuroscience. This theory-
ladenness occurs when researchers interpret neuroimaging findings in terms of theories of 
cognition, which come with certain ontologies and assumptions about cognitive architectures and 
processes. However, these are not the only theories involved in fMRI research, which can be clearly 
seen when one looks at the scientific foundations of fMRI. The development of fMRI includes two 
separate trajectories of research; one in physics and the other in physiology. Research in these 
trajectories had progressed unconnected for decades from the 1920s to the 1990s and eventually 
converged to give rise to fMRI. The trajectory in physics had led to the discovery of the 
phenomenon of nuclear magnetic resonance (NMR) and its later application in the development of 
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). The one in physiology had led to the discovery that changes in 
cerebral blood flow could be measured using MRI as the blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) 
response. These bodies of work had produced well-established and reliable scientific and technical 
knowledge which served as the foundations of fMRI. In addition, the techniques necessary for 
processing, filtering, and modeling raw data were provided by mathematics (e.g. Fourier 
transforms), advanced programming, and statistics.
4
 
 I argue that these theoretical and technical foundations give rise to a different kind of theory-
ladenness in fMRI, which is productive because it enables fMRI studies to generate reliable data on 
the relationships between hemodynamic processes and cognitive task performance. 
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 Colin Klein (2010) provides a concise review of similar works by cognitive scientists who disagree on the epistemic 
value of neuroimaging. 
4
 For a detailed account of the history of the development of fMRI see, for example, Aktunc, 2011,  Le Bihan, 2014. 
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2. The Two Senses of Productive Theory-Ladenness in fMRI: 
Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI enables researchers to: 
(a) identify, and control for, different types of methodological and inferential errors that may 
arise in the use of fMRI, and, 
(b) represent and investigate neural and cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data 
generated by fMRI as subjects perform well-defined tasks.
5
 
The above statements can be unpacked as follows: 
In an fMRI experiment:  
 (1) Magnetic resonance phenomena, Pm , and hemodynamic phenomena, Ph , are used to 
 investigate relationships between neural phenomena, Pn , and cognitive phenomena, Pc. 
  (1.1) Connections between Pm, Ph, and Pn have been previously well-established  
  by evidence from physics of magnetic resonance and physiology of   
  hemodynamics. 
  (1.2) Connections between Pn and Pc have been previously established by   
  neurobiological and neuropsychological evidence. 
(2) Theories of magnetic resonance, Tm , and theories of hemodynamics, Th , are utilized to 
build the fMRI scanner that provides data on hemodynamic phenomena related to cognitive 
task performance.
6
 
 (3) The terms and techniques derived from Tm and Th plus computational and statistical 
 techniques, are used to identify, formulate, and control for errors that may potentially 
 jeopardize inferences in an fMRI experiment. 
 (4) Thanks to 1 - 3, researchers can obtain reliable experimental data on relationships 
 between Pn and Pc. 
(5) Thanks to 1 - 4, relationships between Pn and Pc can be represented and investigated 
using the terms of Tm and Th in methodologically robust experiments. 
 
                                                 
5
 The term ‘productive theory-ladenness’ is not necessarily novel; for example, Chang (2012) uses it in his discussion of 
Hanson. However, in that context, theories are productive in the sense that they give “intelligibility to observations” by 
providing a conceptual framework and auxiliary assumptions (p.89). I use the term in a different, more methodological 
sense in which the knowledge and control of potential errors are productive in establishing the reliability of findings. It 
is also important to note that what makes this kind of theory-ladenness productive is not interdisciplinarity per se but 
precisely (a) and (b) above. 
6
 Of course, in an fMRI experiment, theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics are complemented with 
computational and statistical techniques (e.g. Fourier transforms, spatial and temporal filtering, multivoxel pattern 
analysis, etc.) to preprocess, model and analyze data, which also constitute part of the productive theory-ladenness 
described here.  
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Propositions (2) and (3) above refer to the foundations of fMRI coming from theories of magnetic 
resonance and theories of hemodynamics, which establish that fMRI findings are laden in these 
theories and that productive theory-ladenness is a kind of theory-ladenness. Conclusions (4) and (5) 
above establish this kind of theory-ladenness as a productive kind because it is generative of any 
robust fMRI data set before issues of inference to cognitive functioning enter the picture. 
Regardless of what theoretical/computational approach a cognitive scientist employs or what type 
of inference a researcher decides to employ on a data set (e.g. adopting different types and/or 
techniques of reverse inference, see Nathan & Del Pinal (2017)), the first necessity is the generation 
of a reliable data set free of methodological flaws. This is made possible thanks to productive 
theory-ladenness. Thus, all who rely on fMRI data for their research must also rely on this 
productive theory-ladenness, which admittedly is quite different from the classic sense of theory-
ladenness often cited to support skepticism of neuroimaging. So, it is necessary to delineate this 
concept of productive theory-ladenness in the context of previous discussions on theory-ladenness 
in philosophy of science. 
3. Duhem, Kuhn, Hanson and Productive Theory-Ladenness: 
Claims to the effect that experimental data are theory-laden abound in philosophies of science since 
the widely influential works of Kuhn (1962/2012) and Hanson (1958), who famously stated that 
“seeing is a ‘theory-laden’ undertaking” (p. 19), meaning that our observations of objects are laden 
with our prior knowledge of those objects. Although Kuhn and Hanson discuss some examples of 
research that feature observations generated by scientific equipment, such as microscopes or 
telescopes, their arguments are mainly about observation as a perceptual process. Yet, most 
contemporary scientific observation is done through the use of complicated instruments, such as 
electron microscopes, DNA sequencers, or fMRI, which work on the well-established principles 
provided by experiments and theories. As such, one could say that contemporary scientific 
observation is more theory-laden compared to earlier times. 
 Admittedly, the term theory-ladenness is ambiguous but Heidelberger (2003) usefully 
disambiguates and defines three different kinds of theory-ladenness, each of which he associates 
with Hanson, Duhem, or Kuhn. Heidelberger argues that, according to Hanson, apart from 
ladenness in human perception, theory-ladenness in science occurs when a theory is used to 
establish causal connections between observed phenomena. In this sense, theory-ladenness for 
Hanson is causality-ladenness: "The notions behind 'the cause x' and 'the effect y' are intelligible 
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only against a pattern of theory, namely one which puts guarantees on inferences from x to y." 
(Hanson, 1958; p. 64) For example, when people have difficulty recalling lists consisting of similar 
sounding words, namely the phonological similarity effect, this can be explained by a theory which 
posits that words are encoded and represented in memory in an acoustic or phonological format, 
which interferes with the recall of similar words (e.g. Baddeley & Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2003). 
The effect of impaired recall of similar sounding words would be causally explained by the 
theoretical posit that these words are acoustically or phonologically encoded. 
 Heidelberger (2003) then distinguishes Duhem's conception of theory-ladenness from 
Hanson's. For Duhem, theory-ladenness is not about establishing causal connections, but it occurs 
when the terms and relations proposed by a theory are used to state and interpret observed 
phenomena in an abstract and symbolic structure. However, not every field of science may be 
advanced enough to have produced theories with such symbolic or mathematical structures; so 
Heidelberger adds, when Duhem talks about theory-ladenness he seems to have in mind physics and 
its theories and not, for instance, physiology.
7
 
 Following Hanson and Duhem, Heidelberger (ibid.) continues with Kuhn. Theory-ladenness, 
for Kuhn, is "paradigm-ladenness" where a researcher can make sense of experimental phenomena 
only in terms of the theory (or theories) in the normal-scientific tradition in which she works. To 
elaborate, Heidelberger asks, when do anomalies, i.e. experimental findings unexpected by the 
paradigm, occur? What makes them anomalies? Is it because they do not fit a theoretical and 
abstract structure (a la Duhem) or they require the proposition of new causal connections (a la 
Hanson)? In other words, where do paradigm-induced expectations regarding experimental results 
come from? Heidelberger argues that if we look at examples discussed by Kuhn, we see that it is 
theoretical interpretation, or assimilation to theory, rather than causal understanding, that takes 
precedence in determining whether or not a series of findings are deemed anomalous for a given 
paradigm. On this point, Heidelberger distinguishes yet another possible meaning of theory-
ladenness, which he calls "theory-guidance." Put specifically, this relates to "how the disposition to 
make a particular observation depends on the theoretical background [of a researcher]" (p.144). He 
argues that because this disposition is irrelevant to the "meaning of observation sentences" it must 
not be understood as genuine theory-ladenness.  
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 Thus, left with "theory-ladenness through appeal to causal understanding" (Hanson) and 
"theory-ladenness through theoretical interpretation" (Duhem and Kuhn), and also having argued 
that theoretical interpretation goes much further than causal understanding, Heidelberger concludes 
that it is better to reserve the term ‘theory-ladenness’ to refer only to "genuine theoretical 
interpretation that transcends causal understanding ..." (ibid., p.146). 
 Regardless of the extent to which Heidelberger's account can be criticized, productive 
theory-ladenness, as described in section two above, fits none of the notions of theory-ladenness 
Heidelberger disambiguates. This is because none of those are about methodological errors or 
representing phenomena in terms of theories and knowledge that provide the foundations for the 
instrument used by the researcher. In addition, skeptical arguments of fMRI have focused 
extensively on the kind of theory-ladenness through theoretical interpretation, which Heidelberger 
associates with Duhem and Kuhn. Productive theory-ladenness in fMRI is neither about any of the 
kinds of theory-ladenness Heidelberger defines nor is it involved when skeptics charge that fMRI 
findings are overly laden with cognitive theories. This is because theories enabling productive 
theory-ladenness in fMRI are obviously not theories about cognition. One crucial thing to note here 
is that productive theory-ladenness occurs when fMRI is used to achieve the aims of cognitive 
neuroscience. That is, it emerges out of the convergence of a technique built on physical and 
physiological knowledge and a group of researchers’ motivation to investigate the neural bases of 
cognitive processes. When the skeptics charge fMRI research of pernicious theory-ladenness, they 
refer to the dangerously circular use of cognitive theories in the interpretation of findings. While, on 
the other hand, productive theory-ladenness arises out of the theories of magnetic resonance and 
hemodynamics; it is much less about the cognitive theoretical interpretation of findings and much 
more so about providing reliable findings in the first place.  
The themes of the skeptical accounts of fMRI discussed above remind one of the old and 
well-known difficulties in psychological science that have been with us since its very beginnings. 
The point at which they cross paths with cognitive neuroscience is when we ask whether or not 
neuroimaging data could be used to adjudicate between competing theories of cognition, which 
reflects a theory-centered approach that has not been very fruitful in expanding the philosophical 
discussion on neuroimaging. The question about the theoretical import of fMRI findings cannot be 
addressed without careful scrutiny of the methodological characteristics of this technique. 
Skepticism about the theoretical significance of neuroimaging is to a great extent supported by 
arguments claiming that inferences in neuroimaging depend on unreliable procedures. Only an 
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account that specifically addresses aspects of methodological and inferential procedures in fMRI 
can provide satisfactory answers to the skeptics. The theory-centered approach has not done this 
sufficiently to shed any light on what can and what cannot be learned from neuroimaging. 
 Another reason why the theory-centered approach has not been fruitful is that it overly limits 
the range of philosophical discussions on neuroimaging. If we approach neuroimaging solely as a 
potential source of evidence to adjudicate between theories of cognition, we may overlook 
important questions about the use of instruments and kinds of theory-ladenness in experiment and 
inference. Instead, when one expands the set of questions about fMRI to include its detailed 
workings, philosophical discussions on neuroimaging will be rendered richer as well as more easily 
connected to other philosophical discussions on the use of instruments in other fields of science, 
which can potentially lead to fruitful results in general philosophy of science. Indeed, Kuhn also has 
pointed at the significance of the use of instruments in experiments. In The Structure he wrote, "At 
a level lower or more concrete than that of laws and theories, there is, for example, a multitude of 
commitments to preferred types of instrumentation and to the ways in which accepted instruments 
may legitimately be employed" (Kuhn, 1962/2012; pp.40-41). In fact, this is related to the 
distinction between theory-ladenness through theoretical interpretation and theory-ladenness 
through causal understanding mentioned above. In an experiment, we can talk about theories of the 
phenomena under study and theories of the instrument used to generate measurements. 
Furthermore, these theories may be independent of each other. Heidelberger (2003) points to this 
theme in Kuhn: "... even in Kuhn a sense turns up in which experiment can be independent of the 
theoretical commitments of a paradigm and dependent only on an entrenched tradition of 
instrumentation ..." (p.145). In an fMRI experiment, we can talk about theories of cognition and 
theories of the instrument, i.e. theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics, which are 
independent of theories of cognition. The fMRI scanner is used as a powerful causal agent in 
generating data, but its workings are not embedded in theories of cognition. As Mayo (1996) and 
Heidelberger (2003), among others, diagnose, Kuhn's insights into normal science and experiments 
have not been pursued further by Kuhn or his followers. Nonetheless, the possible occurrences of 
productive theory-ladenness in other fields of research, especially those that rely on complex 
measurement and data collection techniques, can be investigated and potentially lead to significant 
contributions to general philosophy of science. In describing the productive theory-ladenness in 
fMRI, one of my aims is to contribute to the pursuance of these insights into theory-ladenness and 
use of instruments in experiment.  
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4. The Contributions of Productive Theory-Ladenness: 
Productive theory-ladenness contributes in two different ways to cognitive neuroscience, namely in 
the senses (a) and (b) as described in section two above. Here, I illustrate these by giving concrete 
examples of each. 
4.1. Identifying and Controlling for Errors: 
In the growing body of philosophical work focusing on methodology in neuroimaging, Roskies 
(2008, 2010a) is especially helpful in framing productive theory-ladenness. She raises a distinction 
between the actual versus perceived epistemic status of conclusions and suggests that the perceived 
epistemic status of neuroimages is higher than their real status. Roskies writes, “determining actual 
epistemic status will involve a characterization of the inferential steps that mediate between 
observations and the phenomena they purport to provide information about” (Roskies, 2010a; 
p.197). She introduces the term inferential distance to refer to the totality of these inferential steps; 
the more the inferential steps the bigger the inferential distance. Per Roskies’s diagnosis, the 
problem is a mismatch between the “actual inferential distance” and the “apparent inferential 
distance” going from brain activity to the neuroimages presented as findings. Furthermore, she 
suggests that this inferential distance cannot be univocally characterized.  
Roskies is definitely right in saying that neuroimaging results are too often overinterpreted. 
However, her suggestion that the inferential distance cannot be univocally characterized can be 
resisted. It is certainly true that there is a great number of technical and inferential procedures in 
neuroimaging that have to be carried out between initial measurements of brain activation and final 
brain images. Because of the complexity of these procedures, Roskies suggests that the number and 
nature of these inferential steps cannot be sufficiently characterized, which lowers the reliability of 
inferences (Roskies, 2010a). I argue that Roskies’s inferential distance problem can be satisfactorily 
addressed when we break down an experiment into its component parts from design to data 
collection and analysis and then assess the error probabilities associated with each component. In an 
fMRI experiment, if these error probabilities are high, then researchers would have to concede that 
we cannot obtain reliable evidence from the experiment. For example, the scanner used in the 
experiment may have been oversensitive and detected background noise as task-related activation. 
If the error probabilities associated with component parts of an experiment are low enough to rule 
out or minimize errors, then we can safely conclude that researchers can obtain reliable data from 
the experiment and make warranted inferences. This is how we can go the inferential distance, as it 
were, and it is made possible thanks to productive theory-ladenness, which provides the theoretical 
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and technical knowledge of the workings of fMRI, errors that may occur in its use, and ways in 
which these errors can be formulated and controlled.  
 I suggest that the dependence of fMRI on these complex procedures is what creates the 
productive theory-ladenness which enables researchers to represent and study cognitive phenomena 
in terms of cerebral blood flow. Findings in fMRI experiments are laden with the theories of 
magnetic resonance and hemodynamics and this reminds one of a distinction Duhem (1906/1991) 
had raised between physics and physiology. The physiologists make their observations using 
measurement techniques based on the established theories of physics, whereas physicists have to 
test their theories based on the theories of physics. That is, physicists do not have the bonus of 
relying on theories previously established by another field of research. Cognitive neuroscientists 
using fMRI have to rely on not only physics but also on physiology. At first look, it may seem that 
cognitive neuroscientists are at a yet higher degree of theory-ladenness than physiologists. 
However, if we remember that these theoretical bases sit on solid foundations, we can see that this 
kind of theory-ladenness is productive because it allows for what Hacking (1983) would call 
representation of and intervention in cognitive phenomena using concepts and methods provided by 
theories of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics. 
 The above account can also be related to Hacking’s explanation of how the reality of dense 
bodies in blood is established using different types of experimental techniques, namely, electron 
microscopes and fluorescent staining, which yield the same result. Specifically speaking, in both 
types of experiments, small dots in red blood platelets are observed. In order to argue for the reality 
of these findings, Hacking appeals to an argument from coincidence; it would be a highly 
improbable coincidence that independent procedures yield the same result unless these small dots 
are real entities rather than instrumental artifacts. He cites two reasons why the dense bodies are real 
entities: one reason is the fact that experimental instruments using different physical theories yield 
the same observations, and the other is that we have a clear understanding of the physical theories 
that are used to build those instruments. Early in the development of fMRI, experiments were done 
on cognitive processes of which we have a clear understanding from previous non-imaging research 
(e.g. perceptual or motor functions) to check for its reliability. These experiments have yielded 
observations that agreed with the previously established findings. For example, we know from 
previous biopsychological research that visual perception is related to activation in the brain area 
known as the occipital cortex. It was shown in experiments, in which subjects performed visual 
tasks, that the scanner registered high degrees of activation in the same region (e.g. see Kwong et 
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al., 1992; Ogawa et al., 1992). This is an example of what is stated in proposition (1.2) in section 
two above. It would be a preposterous coincidence that various types of experiments using different 
tools and paradigms yield the same kind of artifactual result unless visual functions are indeed 
related to activation in the occipital cortex.  
The stronger reason that fMRI is a reliable tool is that we have a clear understanding of the 
theories on which it is built. Our scientific understanding of magnetic resonance and hemodynamics 
gives rise to productive theory-ladenness, which enables researchers to identify and control for the 
types of errors they may commit using the fMRI scanner, i.e. in the sense (a) of productive theory-
ladenness, which also makes possible sense (b) of productive theory-ladenness, both described in 
section two above. For example, scanners that use high-strength magnetic fields may lead to false 
positives and this can be scrutinized as an error-characteristic of the scanner. The fMRI scanner 
works by generating a powerful magnetic field. By applying a strong magnetic field to the chamber 
inside the scanner, it detects inhomogeneities in the magnetic field as the blood-oxygen-level-
dependent (BOLD) response. There are two fundamental problems in this process: the first problem 
is that the change in the BOLD signal between experimental conditions is very small; what the 
scanner detects as the difference between conditions is an absolute but very small effect. The ratio 
of the intensity of the task-related signal and its general variability due to all sources of noise yields 
a very small value. The second problem has to do with variability in the signal over time, which is 
influenced by several factors. For example, the temperature of the subject's body, head motion, 
heart rate, and respiration are all factors that influence the variability of the signal in addition to the 
cognitive task being performed. Consequently, the task-related change in the BOLD signal is very 
small when compared to its total variability, so there is a danger of the task-related change in the 
BOLD signal being masked by other sources of variability. In other words, the signal of interest 
may easily be lost in the noise. Because of this, some fMRI experiments end up lacking sufficient 
power to detect task-related signals of interest. Researchers deal with this problem by defining the 
functional signal-to-noise ratio (SNR); the signal is defined as the difference between two states of 
brain activity hypothesized to be caused by the cognitive task performed and noise is defined as the 
overall variability in data over time. The functional SNR is the ratio between these two quantities 
(for a detailed description, see Huettel et al., 2004, 2008). The higher the functional SNR, the easier 
it is to detect task-related changes in data. There are several different ways of improving the 
functional SNR, one of which is to use scanners that generate stronger magnetic fields. The strength 
of a magnetic field is measured in terms of the Tesla (T) unit; as a reference point, the strength of 
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the earth’s magnetic field is 0.00005T. In cognitive neuroscience, scanners with magnetic field 
strengths from 1.5T to 7.0T are employed (Lazar, 2008; Hashemi et al., 2010). A primary factor 
determining functional SNR is net magnetization, which is proportional to the strength of the 
magnetic field, so SNR increases roughly linearly with field strength. Thus, as researchers use 
scanners of higher magnetic field strength, the functional SNR is improved. 
However, one issue with increased magnetic field strength is that at higher field strengths 
more noise is detected by the scanner in addition to the task-related signal. For example, 
physiological noise increases quadratically with field strength (Huettel et al., 2004;  p.239). 
Consequently, as field strength is increased, there is a greater danger of the scanner detecting noise 
as if it is a real effect. When scanners of higher field strengths are used, task-related changes in the 
BOLD signal may be lost in increased physiological noise. Thus, at field strengths higher than 4.0T 
we may get too many cases where noise is detected as a real effect. This has been noted by Savoy 
(2001) as a concern about fMRI in general; he also argues that this is similar to the problem raised 
by Meehl (1967) who claimed that if we sufficiently increase the power of significance tests, we can 
reject any null hypothesis even if it is exactly true. Likewise, it appears that if we use a high-
strength scanner, we may, with greater probability, find supporting evidence for hypotheses about 
activation-task performance mappings even if they are false. The observed activation may simply be 
noise and have nothing to do with the cognitive task. This is an error characteristic of a certain 
component of the experiment, which must be scrutinized. In general, one could argue that 
increasing field strength increases the probability of errors and researchers can use this knowledge 
as a guide in evaluating the possibility that they have a real effect as opposed to an artifact of the 
scanner. 
Naturally, there are other factors that may also lead to the detection of noise as a real effect 
or other types of errors, e.g. preprocessing protocols, multiple testing, thresholding, or spatial or 
temporal filtering problems. Potential errors stemming from these factors can be similarly 
identified, formulated, and minimized thanks to productive theory-ladenness.
8
 For example, several 
groups of researchers have conducted a series of studies assessing different preprocessing protocols, 
which gave rise to the “nonparametric prediction, activation, influence, and reproducibility 
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effective way of controlling for potential errors, for details see Mayo (1996) and Mayo & Spanos (2011). These error 
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resampling” or NPAIRS framework (Strother et al., 2002; LaConte et al., 2003). This framework 
applies cross-validation: an fMRI data set is split into two halves, one half is designated as the 
“training” data and used to estimate the parameters for a predetermined model. The estimated 
parameters and the model are used to make predictions to be tested on the other half of the data 
designated as “test” data. This process is repeated but with the training and test data switched, i.e. in 
the second application of the process test data are used for training and vice versa. In several runs, 
reproducibility of the experimental findings is assessed by comparing the results of statistical 
analyses on both halves of the data. The flexible nature of this framework allows researchers to 
assess the effects of different types of preprocessing protocols. 
In one study, LaConte et al. (2003) applied different protocols, called analysis chains, which 
included different levels of preprocessing of raw fMRI data. One chain included no preprocessing 
procedures, whereas others included normalization and different degrees of spatial filtering, i.e. one 
chain applied a narrow filter and another chain applied a wide filter. Then, they conducted statistical 
analyses on data sets that came from these different analysis chains in order to assess the effects of 
different preprocessing protocols on prediction accuracy and reproducibility. The results showed 
that spatial filtering (smoothing) was the most effective procedure for improving prediction 
accuracy and reproducibility. However, as LaConte and his colleagues note, there are no general 
pre-data guidelines for the optimal preprocessing protocol for all experiments (ibid.). The optimality 
of a preprocessing protocol is dependent not only on the elements of the protocol, as in how much 
smoothing or normalization was applied, but also on other experimental parameters such as the type 
of scanner used, design of the experiment, etc. As Lazar (2008) and LaConte et al. (2003) suggest, 
researchers can apply different preprocessing protocols to the same set of raw data, then do 
statistical analyses on the data sets that the different protocols yield. In this way, they can assess the 
effects of these protocols on the same data set. As researchers become more aware of the errors that 
preprocessing procedures may introduce, they can start devising methods of identifying and 
controlling for these errors. The NPAIRS framework is one example, among many, illustrating how 
productive theory-ladenness enables researchers to improve the reliability of methodologies and 
inferences (in sense (a) as described above). 
4.2. Representing and Investigating Cognitive Phenomena: 
In the previous section, we have seen how productive theory-ladenness enables fMRI researchers to 
identify, and control for, methodological and inferential errors. I have also proposed that productive 
theory-ladenness in sense (a) also makes possible sense (b) of productive theory-ladenness as 
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described in section two. That is, it enables researchers to represent and investigate cognitive 
phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data as subjects perform well-defined cognitive tasks. This 
can be illustrated by looking at the development of the HERA model of memory on the basis of 
neuroimaging findings. 
The hemispheric encoding/retrieval asymmetry (HERA) model was proposed by Tulving 
and his colleagues in 1994 (Tulving et al., 1994). When it was first introduced, the HERA model 
was a straightforward description of empirical regularities obtained in PET studies of memory—
although it works differently from fMRI, PET also provides measurements of cerebral blood flow.
9
 
Researchers had obtained differential activation patterns in left and right prefrontal cortical regions 
when subjects engaged in encoding and retrieval tasks of episodic memories. In the context of 
HERA, the terms ‘semantic memory’ and ‘episodic memory’ can be used simply to refer to the 
different kinds of experimental tasks without having to worry too much about the theoretical 
baggage they may carry. These terms denote common phenomena of memory in everyone’s 
experience, such as remembering something or learning something new, and they need not mean 
anything more theoretically complex than that in the context of this discussion.
10
  
In 1994, when the HERA model was proposed, cognitive neuroscience was just becoming a 
discipline of its own and researchers were beginning to obtain new empirical regularities. In this 
environment, HERA was proposed in a data-driven manner on the basis of PET findings. Tulving 
and colleagues (1994) did a series of PET studies and also reviewed studies from different 
laboratories in which subjects performed three types of tasks; semantic memory retrieval, episodic 
memory encoding, and episodic memory retrieval. They saw some regularities in the observed 
patterns of brain activation and summarized these regularities in a set of hemodynamic statements: 
1) Left prefrontal cortical regions are activated in semantic memory retrieval to a greater extent than 
right prefrontal cortical regions; 2) Left prefrontal cortical regions are activated in encoding novel 
features of retrieved information into episodic memory to a greater extent than the right prefrontal 
                                                 
9
 Though on the basis of different physical knowledge, productive theory-ladenness occurs in PET, too. Indeed, it 
should be clear by now that productive theory-ladenness occurs in any successful use of a complex instrument of 
measurement or observation.  
10
 Nonetheless, it is still the case that experimental knowledge coming from behavioral experiments in the cognitive 
psychology of human memory played a major role in designing the tasks used in neuroimaging experiments. Thus, the 
question arises; ‘to what extent does experimental knowledge from cognitive psychology provide background 
knowledge for neuroimaging experiments?’ This question is related to issues of cognitive ontology, which I plan to 
address elsewhere, but it is not directly relevant to my purposes here. 
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cortical regions; and, 3) Right prefrontal cortical regions are involved in episodic memory retrieval 
to a greater extent than left prefrontal cortical regions. Essentially, these three hemodynamic 
statements constituted the initial version of the model.  
In 1996, Nyberg, Cabeza, and Tulving published a review article reporting results from both 
PET and fMRI experiments. Again, the great majority of these experiments exhibited the same 
findings predicted by HERA with only a few exceptions (Nyberg, Cabeza, & Tulving, 1996). 
Gabrieli et al. (1998) used similar encoding tasks in which subjects were shown pictures and found 
a significantly high degree of activation in the right inferior frontal cortical regions as subjects 
performed encoding tasks. In another study, Kelley et al. (1998) found a significantly high degree of 
activation in the right prefrontal cortical regions in a similar encoding task. Both sets of findings 
contradict the model, which predicts a higher degree of activation in the left prefrontal cortex in 
encoding tasks. Some researchers concluded on the basis of these findings that the asymmetry of 
prefrontal cortex activations is due to the type of stimuli used, i.e. verbal versus non-verbal, rather 
than being caused by encoding versus retrieval. 
Unsatisfied with their explanations of the findings contradicting HERA, Habib, Nyberg, and 
Tulving (2003) reformulated the model to be stricter and more precise in its assertions. But also, 
they insisted that HERA was a set of statistical hypotheses that compared degrees of activation in 
the prefrontal cortical regions between encoding and retrieval tasks rather than a set of absolute 
hypotheses. In this reformulation, there were two specific hemodynamic hypotheses which were 
expressed using abbreviations: ‘Enc’=encoding, ‘Ret’=retrieval, ‘L’=a given left prefrontal cortical 
region and ‘R’=corresponding region in the right prefrontal cortex. Combinations of task (Enc or 
Ret) and regions (L or R) stood for the observed activation during a given task in a given region, 
e.g., ‘Enc L’ stood for the activation observed in a specific region in the left prefrontal cortex during 
an encoding task. Thus, the two hemodynamic hypotheses that constitute the model were stated: 1. 
(Enc L–Ret L) > (Enc R–Ret R); and 2. (Ret R–Enc R) > (Ret L–Enc L) (ibid., p. 241). Several 
fMRI experiments, as well as experiments that used newer neuroimaging techniques, yielded results 
that supported the model since its reformulation (see Babiloni et al., 2006, Cole 2006, Thimm et al., 
2010, and Okamoto et al., 2011).  
HERA was proposed as a description of a set of hemodynamic findings showing asymmetry 
in patterns of brain activation between encoding and retrieval tasks in episodic memory. It is to be 
noted that strict interpretations of modularist theories imply that there cannot be a single model like 
HERA, because, for some of these theories, neuroimaging results make sense only if they talk about 
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cognitive modules executing specific computations defined by the theory and located in a 
neuroanatomically distinct part of the brain. This is why some suggest that before we can use 
neuroimaging techniques to study cognition we first have to have an accurate and complete 
psychological theory of cognitive systems down to the most specific, separate function. Yet, all the 
experiments done or cited by Tulving and his colleagues in support of HERA reported activations 
from several cortical regions. These regions were all in the prefrontal cortex but were either 
adjacent to each other or a few centimeters apart. For some modularist theories, it is not clear 
whether or not these different regions of the prefrontal cortex would be taken to be 
neuroanatomically distinct to a sufficient degree. Thus, HERA will not make much sense for 
anyone who adheres to a strictly modularist theory. 
For some others, these findings may constitute a refutation of strictly modularist theories of 
cognition. A defense of neuroimaging against putting rigid theoretical requirements on what can be 
accepted as a genuine finding has been offered by Roskies (2010b). Roskies has also rightly argued 
that neuroimaging never truly claimed to support such strong theoretical conclusions as strict 
modularity or the like. Instead, it has the more pragmatic goal of revealing what it can about 
regularities between neural phenomena and cognitive function (ibid.). What I wish to argue is that 
independently of what large-scale cognitive theory one adopts, the HERA model stands as a set of 
robust hemodynamic findings and it is fruitful for cognitive neuroscience to talk about a well-
established empirical regularity in observed brain activation patterns in the prefrontal cortex during 
encoding and retrieval tasks. In addition, HERA came out of a data-driven approach and was 
described mostly in terms of hemodynamic hypotheses, which did not assume too much about 
cognitive theories of human memory systems. For example, even if we stop using cognitive 
theoretic terms such as semantic or episodic memory, we can still talk about the model in terms of 
specific, well-defined memory tasks. The hemodynamic findings, on the basis of which HERA was 
developed, would still stand when theories of cognitive science change and new cognitive 
ontologies divide and categorize human memory differently, or exclude altogether strict 
categorizations, or redefine cognition to include processes and entities outside the brain. Come what 
may theoretically, cognitive scientists will still have to accommodate the HERA findings in terms of 
whatever cognitive constructs they adopt. 
After it was initially proposed, several groups of researchers have done various 
neuroimaging experiments to test the HERA model, a great majority of which yielded supporting 
results. Also, however, it was reformulated to be more precise in its assertions in response to some 
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seemingly contradictory results. Now, HERA is a well-established model, built on hemodynamic 
findings, that describes a certain pattern in which the human brain works when individuals engage 
in memory tasks of encoding and retrieval. This model is a contribution of cognitive neuroscience 
to the general understanding of relationships between the human brain and cognition. Researchers 
were able to formulate, test, and refine HERA using neuroimaging relatively independently of 
large-scale theories of cognition and this was made possible, at least partially, thanks to productive 
theory-ladenness. 
5. Conclusion: 
I have proposed that the scientific foundations of fMRI give rise to productive theory-ladenness in 
cognitive neuroscience. I have also proposed that there are two ways in which this productive 
theory-ladenness occurs, namely, it enables researchers to (a) identify and control for the types of 
methodological and inferential errors that may arise in fMRI studies, and, (b) represent and 
investigate neural and cognitive phenomena in terms of hemodynamic data as subjects perform 
well-defined tasks. We have seen how these two aspects of productive theory-ladenness can be 
illustrated with concrete examples; such as correcting for physiological noise and identifying the 
most reliable preprocessing protocol using the NPAIRS framework as examples of (a) and the 
discovery and development of the HERA model as an example of (b). These two aspects also reflect 
the two different paths of growth of experimental knowledge in cognitive neuroscience, namely, 1) 
the growth of knowledge improving the reliability of measurement and data analyses, and 2) the 
growth of knowledge of connections between patterns of neural activation and performance of 
cognitive tasks. The development and use of NPAIRS illustrate (1) and the evolution of HERA, as 
new neuroimaging data became available, illustrates (2). 
The arguments and examples above motivate a more pragmatic and fruitful approach in the 
philosophy of neuroimaging. When we look at fMRI with an eye toward appreciating the kinds of 
knowledge it can reliably provide, we can see it as a tool for expanding our knowledge on 
relationships between hemodynamic processes and cognition instead of limiting it as only a novel 
tool for adjudicating between existing theories of cognition. When fMRI, and other similar 
instruments, are used in methodologically robust ways, the results can be used not only to 
adjudicate between existing theories but also can yield novel findings and insights into relationships 
between neural and cognitive phenomena independently of these theories. To use Hacking's famous 
phrase, experiment in cognitive neuroscience has “a life of its own,” which has two related paths of 
growth made possible thanks to productive theory-ladenness. 
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